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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Rupa Marya, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., et al.
Defendants.
_______________________________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. CV 13-4460-GHK
(MRWx)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
(1) CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 179);
(2) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL
EVIDENCE (Dkt. 223); and (3)
PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE
APPLICATION TO SUPPLEMENT
THE RECORD (Dkt. 224) 
This matter is before us on the Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
(“Cross-Motions”).  On March 23, 2015, we held a hearing on the Cross-Motions.  (Dkt.
207 (minutes); Dkt. 208 (transcript).)  On May 18, 2015, we ordered additional briefing,
(Dkt. 215), and on July 29, 2015, we held a further hearing.  (Dkt. 229 (minutes); Dkt.
230 (transcript).)  As the Parties are familiar with the facts, we will repeat them only as
necessary.  Accordingly, we rule as follows:
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I.  Background
Plaintiffs Rupa Marya, Robert Siegel, Good Morning to You Productions Corp.,
and Majar Productions, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this class action to declare
invalid Defendants Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. (“Warner/Chappell”) and Summy-
Birchard, Inc.’s (“Summy-Birchard”) (collectively, “Defendants”) purported copyright in
the famous song Happy Birthday To You (“Happy Birthday”).  (Dkt. 95, Fourth Amended
Consolidated Complaint (“FACC”).)
The classic melody of Happy Birthday is the same as that of another song called
Good Morning To All (“Good Morning”) (hereafter, the “Happy Birthday/Good Morning
melody”).  (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) P17.)  At some time before
1893, Mildred Hill and Patty Hill1 wrote Good Morning.  (SUF P3, P5.)  Mildred
composed the music with Patty’s help, and Patty wrote the lyrics.  (SUF P6.)  The lyrics
of Good Morning are similar to those of Happy Birthday:
Good Morning Happy Birthday
  Good morning to you
  Good morning to you
  Good morning dear children
  Good morning to all.
  Happy birthday to you
  Happy birthday to you
  Happy birthday dear [NAME]
  Happy birthday to you.
In 1893, Mildred and Patty assigned their rights to the manuscript containing Good
Morning and other songs to Clayton F. Summy (“Mr. Summy”).  (SUF P7.)  A copy of
the assignment is not available, but the Parties do not dispute that the assignment
1 For convenience and to avoid confusion, we will refer to the Hill sisters by
only their first names throughout our Order, as the Parties have largely done in
their briefing.
2
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 occurred.  (SUF P8.)  That same year, Mr. Summy published the manuscript in, and filed
for copyright registration of, a songbook titled Song Stories for the Kindergarten (“Song
Stories”).  (SUF P10, P13.)  After Mildred died, Jessica Hill, a third Hill sister, filed for
renewal of the copyright to Song Stories in 1921 as one of Mildred’s heirs.  (SUF P44.) 
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, works could receive copyright protection for two
consecutive 28-year terms.  See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909 Act).  Accordingly, copyright
protection for Song Stories, including the song Good Morning, expired in 1949.
The origins of the lyrics to Happy Birthday (the “Happy Birthday lyrics”) are less
clear.  The Happy Birthday lyrics did not appear in Song Stories.  (SUF P18.)  The first
reference to them in print appeared in an article from 1901 in the Inland Educator and
Indiana School Journal: 
A birthday among the little people is always a special occasion.  The one
who is celebrating is decorated with a bright flower or badge and stands in
the center of the circle while the children sing “Happy birthday to you.”
(Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 8.)  The full Happy Birthday lyrics did not appear in the article. 
(SUF P27.)  In 1909, a prayer songbook similarly made reference to the song but did not
include the lyrics.  (J.A. 9.) 
Publication of the full Happy Birthday lyrics first occurred in a 1911 book titled
The Elementary Worker and His Work.  (J.A. 11 at 290; SUF P34.)  The book did not
credit anyone with authorship of the lyrics, but mentioned that Happy Birthday and Good
Morning shared the same tune, and noted that the latter song had been published in Song
Stories.  (J.A. 11 at 290, 294; SUF P35.)  The Elementary Worker and His Work was
registered for a copyright in 1911.  (J.A. 12; SUF P36.)  After 1911, Happy Birthday
appeared in other publications—Harvest Hymns in 1924 and Children’s Praise and
3
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Worship in 1928.2  (J.A. 18, 21; SUF P49, P54.)  These publications similarly did not
credit anyone with creating the Happy Birthday lyrics.  (J.A. 18, 21.)  Children’s Praise
and Worship was registered for a copyright at the time of publication.  (J.A. 22; SUF
P56.)  Next, in the early 1930s, Happy Birthday appeared in a series of movies—Girls
About Town, Bosko’s Party, Strange Interlude, Baby Take a Bow, The Old Homestead,
and ‘Way Down East.  (J.A. 25-26, 30, 35, 39, 41; SUF P64-65, P69, P71, P78, P94,
P102.)  Finally, in 1933, Happy Birthday was performed publically in the play As
Thousands Cheer.  (J.A. 29; SUF P77.)
In 1934, Jessica filed a lawsuit against the producers of As Thousands Cheer for
copyright infringement (hereafter, the “As Thousands Cheer lawsuit”).  (J.A. 32; SUF
P81.)  Notably, the basis for her infringement claim was not that the producers had
infringed any rights she allegedly held in the Happy Birthday lyrics.  Rather, she alleged
that the defendants infringed the copyright in Good Morning, which included the
common melody for the two songs.  (J.A. 32 at 584; SUF P81.)  TIME magazine, the New
York Times, and the New York Herald Tribune all reported the As Thousands Cheer
lawsuit.  (J.A. 34, 37, 90.)  Patty and Jessica were both deposed in that action.  (J.A. 87;
SUF P96.)  In Patty’s deposition, she claimed that she wrote the lyrics to Happy Birthday
around the time Good Morning was created.  (J.A. 87 at 1007.)  The outcome of the As
Thousands Cheer lawsuit is not clear from the record before us, but neither party claims it
has any bearing on the instant action. 
In 1935, the Clayton F. Summy Company (“Summy Co.”) registered copyrights to
two works entitled “Happy Birthday to You”—registration numbers E51988 and E51990. 
(J.A. 44, 48.)  Defendants argue that E51990 is the publication that secured a federal
2As discussed below, Plaintiffs have supplemented the record with another
publication of the Happy Birthday lyrics in 1922. 
4
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copyright in the Happy Birthday lyrics, and they have staked their claim to the lyrics on
that registration.3   
Our record does not contain any contractual agreement from 1935 or before
between the Hill sisters and Summy Co. concerning the publication and registration of
these works.  (SUF P111-12.)  What little information we have about the circumstances
under which E51990 was published and registered comes from a federal lawsuit filed in
1942 by the Hill Foundation—an entity formed by Jessica and Patty4—against Summy
Co. in the Southern District of New York (hereafter, the “Hill-Summy lawsuit”).  (J.A.
50.)  The Amended Complaint, discussed in more detail below, alleged that Summy Co.
had granted licenses to movie and play producers without the Hill sisters’ authorization. 
The Hill Foundation alleged that, in addition to an agreement between Mildred and Patty
and Summy Co. concerning the copyright in Song Stories and Good Morning (the “First
Agreement”), there was another agreement from 1934 and 1935 in which Jessica granted
Summy Co. “a number of licenses” for “various piano arrangements of the song variously
entitled ‘GOOD MORNING TO ALL’ or ‘HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU’” (the
“Second Agreement”).  (J.A. 50 at ¶ 24.)  In Summy Co.’s Answer to the Amended
3 Though the Parties have also discussed registration E51988 in this
litigation, we focus our attention on E51990 throughout this Order because,
according to Defendants, the significance of E51988 is that it lends some weight to
their argument that E51990 registered the lyrics.  (See Hr’g Tr. of Mar. 23, 2015 at
6:7-14 (“COURT: [I]s it your argument that E51990 covers the lyrics and E51988
really puts it into proper context as to why E51990 covers the lyrics?  MR.
KLAUS: It is our position, Your Honor, that E51990 covers—was intended to
cover the lyrics and does cover the lyrics.  And 51988 covers—it was intended to
cover it on the same day, what we’ll call the second verse, refers to it as the revised
text.”).)  The second verse to Happy Birthday found in E51988 has no commercial
value and is not the subject of this action.
4 The record is not actually clear on how the Hill Foundation was formed,
but in 1942, Patty and Jessica assigned their rights in the copyright to Song Stories
to the Foundation.  (J.A. 49.)  Accordingly, it is a reasonable inference that they
jointly formed the entity.  
5
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Complaint, it admitted that it had entered into the Second Agreement with Jessica, stating
that she “assigned . . . various piano arrangements of . . . ‘Good Morning To All’” to
Summy Co.  (J.A. 51 at ¶ 18.) 
In 1944, the Hill sisters and Summy Co. settled the Hill-Summy lawsuit by
entering into a new agreement (the “Third Agreement”).   (J.A. 54; SUF P141.)  The Hill
sisters, via the Hill Foundation, assigned to Summy Co. all of their rights in eleven
different copyrights, including E51990, E51988, and the Song Stories copyright.  (J.A. 54
at 702-03.)  After the Third Agreement, Summy Co. filed three lawsuits alleging
copyright infringement related to Happy Birthday.  (J.A. 55-57.)  E51990 is not
mentioned in the complaints for any of these lawsuits.  (Id.)  When describing the song
Happy Birthday, the complaints each said that “[o]ne of the songs in [Song Stories],
entitled ‘Good Morning To All’, later became popularly known as ‘Happy Birthday to
You’, the opening lines of the verses later written by Patty S. Hill for the song.”  (J.A. 55
at ¶ 15, 56 at ¶ 15, 57 at ¶ 15.)  None of the lawsuits asserted infringement of any
purported right that Summy Co. had to the lyrics from its ownership of E51990. 
On April 21, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their FACC in this action.  (Dkt. 95.)  Plaintiffs
contend that Defendants do not own a copyright in the Happy Birthday lyrics and that they
should be compelled to return the “millions of dollars of unlawful licensing fees” they
have collected by wrongfully asserting copyright ownership in the Happy Birthday lyrics. 
(FACC at ¶ 4.)  We bifurcated this case on October 16, 2013.  (Dkt. 71.)  We will first
determine whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment invalidating
Defendants’ purported claim of copyright in the lyrics.  (Id. at 4.) 
6
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II. New Evidence 
Both Parties recently sought to add new evidence to the summary judgment record
after the Cross-Motions had been taken under submission.  (Dkts. 223-24.)  In particular,
Plaintiffs seek to add evidence regarding the 1922 publication of the fourth revised edition
of The Everyday Song Book.  Good Morning and Happy Birthday are printed as one song
called “Good Morning and Birthday Song” in the book.  (Dkt. 225, Manifold Decl., Ex. C
at 20.)  Below the title of the song, a caption reads: “Special permission through courtesy
of The Clayton F. Summy Co.”  (Id.)  Defendants do not oppose the introduction of this
evidence into the record, but they dispute its significance.  As Plaintiffs’ request to
supplement the record is unopposed, we hereby GRANT that request.  
Defendants seek to introduce new evidence regarding the deposit copy of E51990.  
(Dkt. 223.)  The Copyright Office no longer has the deposit copy for E51990, and
Plaintiffs have argued that the Happy Birthday lyrics may not have even appeared in the
work that was deposited.  (See, e.g., Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (hereafter,
“Joint Brief”) at 25.)  Defendants now proffer a copy of a work that was deposited with
the British Museum on the same day that E51990 was registered, which they claim to have
obtained recently.   (Defs.’ Mot. to Supplement the Record, Ex. A.)   Plaintiffs argue that
the introduction of this evidence is prejudicial because Defendants did not tell Plaintiffs
that they were looking for a copy of the work from the British Museum during discovery. 
We do not see how Plaintiffs are prejudiced by Defendants’ failure to disclose their efforts
to find the British Museum copy.  Plaintiffs were well aware of the dispute surrounding
the deposit copy for E51990, and Defendants’ disclosure of their earlier fruitless efforts
would have had minimal, if any, impact on how Plaintiffs conducted discovery.  
Accordingly, we hereby GRANT Defendants’ request to supplement the record. 
III.  Summary Judgment Standard
7
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We may grant summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  On a motion for summary
judgment, the district court’s “function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Id. at 249. 
The moving party bears the initial responsibility to point to the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
“When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the
evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”  Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975,
987 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  If the moving party meets its
initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper, “the nonmoving party
must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial” in order
to survive summary judgment.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).  Where the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party
can carry its initial burden either by submitting affirmative evidence that there is not a
triable, factual dispute or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party “fail[ed] to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case     .
. . .”  Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.  The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party “to
designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.”  In re
Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 324).  
 
8
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On cross-motions for summary judgment, we must consider each motion separately
to determine whether either party has met its burden with the facts construed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  See Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v.
Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
IV.  Burden of Proof in a Declaratory Judgment Action
Defendants contend that the burden of proof lies with Plaintiffs on all issues
because the default rule places the burden of proof “on the party seeking relief.”  Schaffer
ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005).  The Supreme Court held otherwise in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).  In Medtronic,
the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe the
defendant’s patents.  Id. at 847.  The Court placed the burden of proof on the patentee,
even though it was nominally the defendant.   Id. at 849.  The Court observed that Schaffer
articulated the basic rule for where the burden of proof lies, and it characterized
“declaratory judgment suits like the one at issue here” as an “exception to the basic rule.” 
Id. at 851.
We see no basis for distinguishing Medtronic from the instant action.  Here, too,
Plaintiffs have sought a declaratory judgment in the shadow of a threatened infringement
suit.  (See, e.g., FACC at ¶ 122 (“Faced with a threat of substantial penalties for copyright
infringement, on or about March 26, 2013, plaintiff GMTY was forced to and did pay
defendant Warner/Chappell the sum of $1,500 for a synchronization license . . . .”).) 
Accordingly, just as in Medtronic, there is no reason to relieve the alleged owners of the
intellectual property of the usual burden of proof just because they are nominally the
defendants in this declaratory judgment action.  See also Williams v. Bridgeport Music,
Inc., No. CV-13-6004-JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014)
9
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(applying Medtronic to a declaratory judgment copyright case and concluding that the
defendants have the burden of proof). 
V.  Validity of Defendants’ Copyright
Defendants claim to have a copyright in the Happy Birthday lyrics.  As a musical
work, Happy Birthday has at least two copyrightable elements, the music and the lyrics,
and each element is protected against infringement independently.  See 1-2 Nimmer on
Copyright § 2.05 (“Suppose the plaintiff’s work includes both music and ‘accompanying’
words, but the defendant copies only the plaintiff’s words, unaccompanied by his music,
or only his music, unaccompanied by the words.  It was clear under the 1909 Act, and
remains clear under the present Act, that . . . the copyright . . . will protect against
unauthorized use of the music alone or of the words alone, or of a combination of music
and words.”).  The distinction between the music and the lyrics as copyrightable elements
is critical in this case because both Parties agree that the Happy Birthday melody was
borrowed from Good Morning and entered the public domain a long time ago.  The Parties
disagree only about the status of the Happy Birthday lyrics.  Defendants contend, in brief,
that the Hill sisters authored the lyrics to Happy Birthday around the turn of the last
century, held onto the common law rights for several decades, and then transferred them
to Summy Co., which published and registered them for a federal copyright in 1935. 
Plaintiffs challenge nearly every aspect of this narrative.  They argue that the lyrics may
have been written by someone else, the common law copyrights in the lyrics were lost due
to general publication or abandonment before the lyrics were published, and the rights
were never transferred to Summy Co.3 
3 Plaintiffs also argue that Warner/Chappell cannot establish its chain of title
from Summy Co.  Plaintiffs presented this argument in a single paragraph of the
Cross-Motions.  (See Jt. Br. at 48-49.)  Because we resolve these Cross-Motions on
other grounds, we decline to address this underdeveloped argument.  
10
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A.  Presumption of Validity
Before we address the merits of the Parties’ respective arguments, we must consider
what evidentiary weight should be afforded to the registration certificate for E51990.  The
1909 Copyright Act, which governs E51990, did not require that a work be registered to
obtain a federal copyright.  See 2-7 Nimmer § 7.16.  But registration was nonetheless
highly desirable, not only because it was a precondition to the filing of an infringement
suit, but also because, once registered, the certificate of registration “shall be admitted in
any court as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.”  17 U.S.C. § 209 (1909 Act);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976 Act) (providing for the presumption of validity in the
modern Copyright Act).  Furthermore, “[a]lthough the ‘facts’ stated in a certificate of
registration are limited to the date, name and description of the work, and name of the
registration holder, a majority of courts have held that § 209 [of the 1909 Copyright Act]
creates a rebuttable presumption that the certificate holder has met all the requirements for
copyright validity.”  Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions,
Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1991).  Once a claimant shows that she has a
certificate of registration, the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party who must “offer
some evidence or proof to dispute or deny the [claimant’s] prima facie case.”  United
Fabrics Int’l, Inc. v. C&J Wear, Inc., 630 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011).
“The presumption . . . is not an insurmountable one, and merely shifts to the
[challengers] the burden to prove the invalidity of the [] copyrights.”  Masquerade
Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 668 (3d Cir. 1990).  The underlying
rationale for the presumption of validity is that the Copyright Office implicitly determines
whether a work is copyrightable whenever it issues a registration, and courts should defer
to the Office’s finding.  See, e.g., Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Elsner Co., 482 F. Supp. 980,
988 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“The presumption of validity attaching to copyright registration is
of course a function of judicial deference to the agency’s expertise.”).  But when there is a
11
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material mistake in the registration, the presumption of validity is rebutted, if not voided
altogether.  See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1163 (1st
Cir. 1994) (“We assume for argument’s sake that a material error in a copyright deposit,
even if unintentional, may destroy the presumption of validity.”); Masquerade Novelty,
912 F.2d at 668 n.5 (stating that if the registration contains “a material, but inadvertent
omission,” it may be the correct approach “to deprive the plaintiff of the benefits of [the
presumption of validity] and to require him to establish the copyrightability of the articles
he claims are being infringed”); Wilson v. Brennan, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1251-52
(D.N.M. 2009) (following the approach suggested in Masquerade Novelty and Data
General in denying a copyright claimant any presumption of validity as a result of errors
in a registration); see also Rouse v. Walter & Assocs., L.L.C., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1065
(S.D. Iowa 2007) (concluding that possession of a “belatedly filed [c]ertificate” with no
listed publication date did not, under the circumstances of the case, constitute “prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright”); Gibson Tex, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 11 F.
Supp. 2d 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he failure to alert the Copyright Office to
relationships between the work for which registration is sought and prior works of others
endangers the presumption of validity. . . .  [T]he Court finds that Gibson’s failure to
register the design as a derivative work rebuts the presumption of the copyright’s
validity.”).
Defendants claim that Summy Co. registered the Happy Birthday lyrics in E51990. 
In 1935, a certificate of copyright registration was a very simple document consisting of
nothing more than a copy of the claimant’s registration application and a certification
statement from the Copyright Office.4  See United States Copyright Office, Compendium
4 When these Cross-Motions were initially filed, both Parties presented what
they claimed were the true certificates of registration for E51990 and E51988. 
(Compare J.A. 44 & 48, with J.A. 101 & 103.)  Since then, Defendants have
conceded that Plaintiffs’ proffered documents are the actual certificates.  (See
Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Excl., at 1 (“Plaintiffs are correct that the Copyright Office
12
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of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition (2014), § 2408 (“A[] . . . certificate for a
claim registered or renewed on or before December 31, 1977 consists of a photocopy of
the original application together with a preprinted certification statement containing the
registration or renewal number and the date of the certification.”).  The registration
application for E51990 stated that it was an “Application for Copyright for Republished
Musical Composition with New Copyright Matter.”  (J.A. 48.)  In other words, E51990
was a derivative work.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 Act) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . musical arrangement . . . .”).  
The title of the musical composition was listed as “Happy Birthday to You.”  (J.A. 48.) 
The author of the new copyright material was “Preston Ware Orem, employed for hire by
Clayton F. Summy Co.”  (Id.)  In one blank space, the application prompted the claimant
to “[s]tate exactly on what new matter copyright is claimed . . . .”  (Id.)  For E51990, the
response read: “Arrangement as easy piano solo, with text.”  (Id.)
Defendants contend that this registration entitles them to a presumption of validity. 
We disagree.  Even assuming that the lyrics were printed in the deposit copy for E51990,5
it is unclear whether those lyrics were being registered, and therefore it is unclear whether
the Copyright Office determined the validity of Summy Co.’s alleged interest in the lyrics
in 1935.  The “new matter” that the registration purported to cover was a piano
deems summary judgment Exhibits 48 and 44 (and not Exhibits 101 and 103) to be
the registration certificates for E51990 and E51988 . . . .”).)  Defendants’ purported
certificates are actually just records from the Copyright Office.  (Id. at 6.)  As such,
they do not have the same evidentiary significance as certificates of registration.  
5 On the same day that E51990 was registered, Summy Co. deposited with
the British Museum a copy of sheet music for a song called “Happy Birthday to
You!” containing the Happy Birthday lyrics.  (Defs.’ Mot. to Supplement the
Record, Ex. A.)  The Parties also dispute whether another piece of sheet music was
the deposit copy.  (J.A. 106.)  In light of our analysis regarding transfer below, we
need not determine conclusively what the true deposit copy was because it does not
matter whether the lyrics were printed in the deposit copy of E51990 if the
purported copyright owner had no rights to those lyrics.
13
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arrangement—a derivative version of another melody.  Defendants argue that since the
arrangement was registered “with text,” that meant that the Happy Birthday lyrics were
part of the new matter being registered alongside the arrangement.  But the registration
clearly listed “Preston Ware Orem” as the author of the new matter.  To our knowledge,
no one has ever contended that Orem wrote the Happy Birthday lyrics.  Defendants even
admit in their pleadings that Orem did not do so.  (Compare Dkt. 99, Answer to FACC at
¶ 97 (“[Defendants] admit[] the allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 97.”), with
Dkt. 95, FACC at ¶ 97 (“Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Orem did not
write the familiar lyrics to Happy Birthday . . . .”).)  Therefore, the registration is flawed in
any event.  If, as Defendants assert, the new matter being registered included the lyrics,
then, contrary to the registration certificate, Mr. Orem could not have been the author of
the new matter.  Conversely, if Mr. Orem were the author of the new matter, then the
lyrics could not have been a part of the registration. 
Defendants argue that we should overlook this “mistake”6 and afford the
registration a presumption of validity anyway because “[a]bsent intent to defraud and
prejudice, inaccuracies in copyright registrations do not bar actions for infringement.” 
Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Baron v.
Leo Feist, Inc., 173 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1949) (finding registration adequate for
plaintiff to assert a copyright infringement suit, even though the certificate was “defective
in form in not making clearer that copyright was claimed for the melodies as well as
arrangements”); Urantia Found. v. Burton, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 217, 1980 WL 1176, at
*3 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 1980) (“Under 17 U.S.C. former section 209 the identity of the
author of a work does not have to be disclosed in registering a copyright.  It follows that a
misstatement as to authorship, unless made for some fraudulent purpose will not
6 It would be accurate to characterize the failure to identify Patty as an author
as a “mistake” only if E51990 was a registration of the lyrics.  As discussed more
below, Defendants have no evidence that Summy Co. had any rights to the lyrics in
1935.    
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invalidate an otherwise valid copyright.  That is, the copyright remains valid as long as the
claimant has a legitimate claim of copyright, regardless of who is the actual author.”)
(internal citation omitted).  This legal authority is inapposite because it has no bearing on
the question of what evidentiary presumption can be drawn from the ownership of a
copyright registration.  Because this registration does not list any Hill sister as the author
or otherwise make clear that the Happy Birthday lyrics were being registered, we cannot
presume this registration reflects the Copyright Office’s determination that Summy Co.
had the rights to the lyrics to copyright them.7 
Given this facial and material mistake in the registration certificate, we cannot
presume (1) that Patty authored the lyrics or (2) that Summy Co. had any rights to the
7 Plaintiffs and Defendants have also submitted entries for E51990 from the
U.S. Copyright Office’s Catalog of Copyright Entries.  One is from 1935 when the
work was first registered, and the other is from 1962 when the registration was
renewed.  Neither entry helps to clarify whether the lyrics were registered.  The
Copyright Office regularly published the Catalog to alert the public to registrations
and renewals, and the Copyright Act of 1909 afforded the entries in the Catalog a
presumption of validity, in addition to that afforded to registration certificates.  17
U.S.C.§ 210 (1909 Act).  The 1935 Catalog entry for E51990 is largely the same
as the registration—the work is described as a “pf. [piano forte] with w.
[words]”—but it also says the work is “by Mildred J. Hill” and “arr[anged] [by]
Preston Ware Orem.”  (Dkt. 200, Klaus Decl., Ex. C.)  While the reason why the
Copyright Office wrote this is not entirely clear, it appears that the Office took
Mildred’s name from the deposit copy and put it in the Catalog to identify the
author of the original melody that Orem arranged.  (See id., Ex. B.)  Notably,
Patty’s name is not on the deposit copy and does not appear in the Catalog.  The
1962 Catalog entry also described the work as “by Mildred J. Hill” and “arr[anged]
[by] Preston Ware Orem” (with no mention of Patty Hill).  (J.A. 127.)  But it then
added a new notation indicating that the new matter registered (“NM”) in E51990
was an arrangement (“arr.”)—without mentioning the “words” or “text” as new. 
While these Card Catalog entries may be generally entitled to a presumption of
validity, the discrepancies noted above are sufficient to undermine that
presumption in this case.
15
Case 2:13-cv-04460-GHK-MRW   Document 244   Filed 09/22/15   Page 15 of 43   Page ID
 #:7396
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
lyrics at the time of the E51990 registration.   Accordingly, Defendants must present other
evidence to prove their case.
Normally, at this point, we would proceed with our analysis of the Parties’ Cross-
Motions by first examining the elements that Defendants must prove to establish the
validity of their interest in the Happy Birthday lyrics, and then, if Defendants carry their
burden, we would turn to Plaintiffs’ affirmative defenses.  However, the factual and legal
issues of this case are deeply interwoven and do not lend themselves to a traditional
analytical approach.  The nature of this lawsuit is a dispute over the provenance of
Defendants’ purported interest in the lyrics.  Accordingly, a chronological examination of
the issues, tracing the history of the lyrics up to the point when Summy Co. supposedly
acquired the rights to them, is more logical.  Thus, we will begin with the question of who
wrote Happy Birthday, an issue for which Defendants have the burden of proof because
they must show that their interest can be traced back to the true author of the lyrics.  See
Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1975) (“As one
would expect, the person claiming [a copyright in the work] must either himself be the
author of the copyrightable work . . . or he must have succeeded to the rights of the author
through an assignment or other device.”); cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (noting that, to prove copyright infringement, a copyright owner
must be able to establish “ownership of a valid copyright”).  Then we will consider
whether the lyrics were lost or abandoned at some point after they were written, both of
which are defenses for which Plaintiffs, who would normally be defendants in a traditional
infringement suit, have the burden of proof.  See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688
F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the defendant in a copyright suit has the
burden of proving fair use as well as “all affirmative defenses”); Model Civ. Jury Instr.
9th Cir. 17.19 (2007) (“In order to show abandonment, the defendant has the burden of
proving each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .”); Penguin Books
U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 288 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555
16
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(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“To establish their defense to infringement, defendants must
demonstrate that the work was ‘published,’ as that term is used and defined in the
copyright context, without copyright notice.”).  Finally, we will turn to the question of
whether a valid transfer of rights occurred between the Hill sisters and Summy Co., an
issue for which Defendants again have the burden of proof because it is essential to their
claim that Summy Co. is the owner of a valid copyright. 
B. Who Wrote the Happy Birthday Lyrics?
Defendants claim that Patty wrote the lyrics to Happy Birthday; Plaintiffs claim
someone else may have.8 
Since Plaintiffs do not have the burden of proof on this issue, they may discharge
their initial burden on their Motion by pointing to affirmative evidence negating
Defendants’ authorship claim.  Plaintiffs point to the many publications of the Happy
Birthday lyrics throughout the 1920s and 1930s that did not credit Patty.  References to
the lyrics (without full publication) appeared in 1901 and 1909.  The words were fully
published in 1911, 1912, 1915, 1922, 1924, and 1928.  The song was performed in several
movies in the early to mid-1930s.  Furthermore, though none of these publications
explicitly credited anyone with authoring the Happy Birthday lyrics, several of them were
copyrighted, and the certificates of registration listed other authors.  For instance, The
Elementary Worker and His Work, which was published in 1911 and contained the full
Happy Birthday lyrics, listed Alice Jacobs and Ermina Chester Lincoln as its authors in
8 As discussed more in the abandonment section below, Defendants also
argue that Patty and Mildred were co-authors of Happy Birthday.  We need not
discuss this argument now because the co-authorship argument is not integral to
Defendants’ ownership claim.  Defendants raised the co-author argument in
supplemental briefing to defend themselves against Plaintiffs’ contention that the
rights to the Happy Birthday lyrics were abandoned before 1935.        
17
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the copyright certificate.  (J.A. 12.)  Given that copyright certificates are normally
afforded a presumption of validity, as discussed, this is at least some evidence that these
two individuals may have authored the Happy Birthday lyrics.  Similarly, the publication
and registration of the Happy Birthday lyrics in Harvest Hymns in 1924 demonstrate that
its author may have written the lyrics.  (J.A. 19 (listing “Robert Henry Coleman” as author
of Harvest Hymns).)  This evidence is sufficient to shift the burden to Defendants to
proffer admissible evidence to create a genuine issue for trial.  Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
324.
Defendants’ primary evidence is Patty’s 1935 deposition for the As Thousands
Cheer lawsuit.  (J.A. 87.)  While explaining that she and her sister Mildred created Good
Morning some time around 1893, Patty claimed to have also written the Happy Birthday
lyrics as one of a number of lyrical variations to be sung with the familiar melody:
Q. How long would you say that you and Miss Mildred Hill worked on the
particular song “Good Morning To All” before it was completed. 
A. It was one of the earliest of the group and for that reason took longer to 
work out with the children.  It would be written and I would take it into
the school the next morning and test it with the little children.  If the
register was beyond the children we went back home at night and altered
it and I would go back the next morning and try it again and again until
we secured a song that even the youngest children could learn with perfect
ease and while only the words “Good Morning To All” were put in the
book we used it for “Good-bye to you”, “Happy Journey to You”, “Happy
Christmas to You” and “Happy New Year to You”, “Happy Vacation to
You” and so forth and so on.
Q. Did you also use the words “Happy Birthday to You”? 
A. We certainly did with every birthday celebration in the school. 
Q. Did you write the words for this particular tune of “Good Morning To
All”, Miss Hill? 
A. I did.
(J.A. 87 at 1007.) 
Defendants have raised genuine issues of material fact for trial.  A reasonable fact
finder may choose to believe that Patty wrote the lyrics in 1893 but, for whatever reason,
failed to publically say so until some forty years later.  But a reasonable fact finder could
18
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also find that the Happy Birthday lyrics were written by someone else, such as the authors
of The Elementary Worker and His Work or Harvest Hymns or some unknown person who
never took credit for them,9 and that Patty’s 1935 claim to authorship was a post hoc
attempt to take credit for the words that had long since become more famous and popular
than the ones she wrote for the classic melody.  
For the same reasons, Patty’s deposition testimony would not be sufficient to entitle
Defendants to a directed verdict on the issue of authorship because it is contradicted by
the evidence of multiple publications of the lyrics before 1935, some of which were
registered for copyrights.  We conclude there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. 
The Parties’ Cross-Motions are DENIED on this issue.  
C. Divestive Publication of the Happy Birthday Lyrics
Plaintiffs claim that, even if Patty wrote the Happy Birthday lyrics, she lost the
rights to the lyrics through divestive publication before 1935.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, one secured a federal copyright by publishing a
work with proper notice.  Before such publication, the work was protected by common
law copyright.  See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211,
1214 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Under the regime created by the 1909 Act, an author received
state common law protection automatically at the time of creation of a work.  This state
common law protection persisted until the moment of a general publication.”) (internal
citation omitted).  If the work was published without notice, two things happened: the
author (1) failed to obtain a federal copyright and (2) lost the common law copyright as
9 Plaintiffs argue that Jessica once claimed in a magazine article to have
written the lyrics.  (J.A. 60 at 752.)  That is inaccurate.  She claimed to have been
the first person to have sung the lyrics.
19
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well.  See Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“When a work was published for the first time, it lost state common law protection.  The
owner could, however, obtain federal protection for the published work by complying
with the requirements of the 1909 Copyright Act.  If the owner failed to satisfy the Act’s
requirements, the published work was interjected irrevocably into the public domain
precluding any subsequent protection of the work under the 1909 Copyright Act.”).
General publication, which would cause a forfeiture, occurs “when, by consent of
the copyright owner, the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned,
given away, or otherwise made available to the general public, or when an authorized
offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner, even if a sale or other such
disposition does not in fact occur.”  1 Nimmer § 4.03.  By contrast, a limited publication,
which does not cause a forfeiture, is when “tangible copies of the work are distributed
both (1) to a ‘definitely selected group,’ and (2) for a limited purpose, without the right of
further reproduction, distribution or sale.”  Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis., 944 F.2d
at 1452.  Moreover, “mere performance or exhibition of a work does not constitute a
[general] publication of that work.”  Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027
(9th Cir. 1981). 
On this affirmative defense of divestive publication, Plaintiffs have the burden of
proof and must point to evidence that would entitle them to a directed verdict at trial if it
were uncontroverted.  While Plaintiffs emphasize heavily the evidence in the record
showing that the lyrics were “published, publicly performed, and sung millions of times
for more than three decades,” that is insufficient to show divestive publication in this case. 
(Jt. Br. at 7.)  Unless the owner of the work published it personally or authorized someone
else to publish it, she would not be divested of her common law copyright.  See 2-7
Nimmer § 7.03 (“[A] public distribution of copies or phonorecords will not trigger the
legal consequences of a publication without notice unless it is shown that such public
20
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distribution occurred by or under the authority of the copyright owner.”); see also Holmes
v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899) (author forfeited his work after consenting to its publication);
Egner v. E.C. Schirmer Music Co., 48 F. Supp. 187 (D. Mass. 1942) (author lost his rights
after giving others permission to publish his song); Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137, 1949
WL 4766 (Cal. Super. 1949) (author lost his rights after permitting the distribution and
exhibition of his work in movie theaters throughout the world).
Plaintiffs’ strongest evidence in support of their divestive publication defense is the
publication of Happy Birthday in The Everyday Song Book in 1922.  Unlike the other
publications in the record, the publisher of The Everyday Song Book appears to have had
the permission of at least Summy Co. to print Good Morning and Happy Birthday.  A fact
finder could reasonably infer from this that the Hill sisters authorized Summy Co. to grant
the publisher permission.  After all, Summy Co. and the Hill sisters were hardly strangers
at the time; they had been associated with each other through the publication and
distribution of Song Stories for decades.  If the publication was authorized, that could
make it a general publication (without proper copyright notice), divesting the Hill sisters
of their common law copyright. 
The publication of The Everyday Song Book, however, is not sufficient to entitle
Plaintiffs to a directed verdict at trial.  As Defendants point out, there is no direct evidence
that the Hill sisters had authorized Summy Co. to grant permission for the publication of
the lyrics in The Everyday Song Book.  It is undisputed that, in 1922, Summy Co. did not
have any rights to the Happy Birthday lyrics; Defendants claim that the rights to the lyrics
were given to Summy Co., at the earliest, in 1934 and 1935.  It is also not clear if Summy
Co. gave the publisher of The Everyday Song Book permission to publish the Happy
Birthday lyrics specifically or just permission to publish Good Morning, of which Summy
Co. had been printing and selling copies on the Hill sisters’ behalf at that time.  Since the
publication of The Everyday Song Book would not be sufficient to entitle Plaintiffs to a
21
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directed verdict, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their initial burden under Rule 56.  Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED as to this issue.10
As to Defendants’ Cross-Motion, while the publication of The Everyday Song Book
is not sufficient to entitle Plaintiffs to a directed verdict, it is at least sufficient to show that
there are genuine disputes of material fact.  Accordingly, Defendants’ Cross-Motion is
also DENIED as to this issue.
D. Abandonment of the Happy Birthday Lyrics
Plaintiffs argue that, even if no divestive publication occurred, Patty abandoned her
rights, if any, before the publication and registration of E51990.  “[A]bandonment of
copyright occurs only if there is an intent by the copyright proprietor to surrender rights in
his work.”  A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Under Ninth Circuit law, abandonment “must be
10 Plaintiffs also argue that a general publication occurred when Patty taught
the lyrics to her students and to other teachers around the turn of the Twentieth
Century.  (J.A. 87 at 1018, 1020.)  This argument is also inadequate to entitle them
to summary judgment.  Merely teaching a song to others does not constitute a
general publication.  The evidence shows that Patty did not distribute physical or
tangible copies of the work when teaching the song.  (Id. at 1020-21 (“Q. Were
they furnished with any copies of it?  A. No.”); see also 1-4 Nimmer § 4.03
(“[Under the 1909 Act,] publication occurred when, by consent of the copyright
owner, the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given
away, or otherwise made available to the general public . . . .”) (emphasis added).)  
Even if copies were distributed, this likely would have constituted only a limited
publication because the work would have been distributed (1) to a selected group
and (2) for a limited purpose (education).  See Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967,
971 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (concluding that a book did not enter the public domain
when it was used in a school for the “purpose of imparting instruction to the
pupils” and “copies were [not] required or permitted to be taken of it for any other
purpose”).
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manifested by some overt act indicative of a purpose to surrender the rights and allow the
public to copy.”11  Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.
1960).  Compared to divestive publication, “[a]bandonment . . . turns on the copyright
owner’s intent, while forfeiture results by operation of law regardless of intent.”  2 Patry,
Copyright § 5:155. 
In their supplemental briefing on abandonment, both Parties have cited numerous
cases in support of their respective positions regarding abandonment.  Unfortunately, we
can discern no clear rule for what does or does not constitute abandonment.  Cases from
the early to mid-Twentieth Century fail to make a clear distinction between divestive
publication and abandonment.  See, e.g., White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 745 (9th Cir.
1952) (describing the plaintiff’s complaint as alleging that the work was “abandoned by
White to the general public by his reproducing and distributing copies . . . without notice
of claim of copyright”); Nutt v. Nat’l Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d
236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929) (“Only a publication of the manuscript, amounting to an
abandonment of the rights of the author, will transfer it to public domain.”); Egner, 48 F.
Supp. at 189 (describing author’s conduct as showing “such a tender of the song to the
public generally as to imply an abandonment”).  It is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions about abandonment from these cases.  As for the more recent cases, most
involve factual circumstances that bear little resemblance to this case.  See, e.g., Hadady
11 Plaintiffs argue that abandonment of a common law copyright, as opposed
to a federal copyright, does not require proof of an overt act.  But they do not cite
any case that has ever made this distinction.  If anything, one of the earliest
opinions to articulate the overt act requirement suggested the opposite.  See Nat’l
Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1951)
(“[W]e do not doubt that the ‘author or proprietor of any work made the subject of
copyright’ by the Copyright Law may ‘abandon’ his literary property in the ‘work’
before he has published it, or his copyright in it after he has done so; but he must
‘abandon’ it by some overt act which manifests his purpose to surrender his rights
in the ‘work’ . . . .”) (emphasis added).  We conclude that an overt act is required to
abandon either a common law or statutory copyright.  
23
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Corp. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 n.2, 1398-99 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (abandonment found where newsletter stated it was protected by copyright only for
a certain amount of time); Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1196 (N.D. Ga.
1983) (abandonment found where copyright owner destroyed the only copy of the work). 
As far as a general rule, we think the most that can be said about abandonment is that
evidence of mere inaction or “lack of action” is insufficient.  Hampton, 279 F.2d at 104. 
Beyond this, what does or does not constitute abandonment appears to be a highly fact-
specific inquiry.  
1. Overt Acts of Abandonment by Patty
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof at trial on this affirmative defense.  To prevail on
their Motion, Plaintiffs must present evidence entitling them to a directed verdict if
uncontradicted.  They present a passage from a TIME magazine article reporting on the 
As Thousands Cheer lawsuit, which said:
Because the tune of “Happy Birthday to You” sounds precisely like the tune
of “Good Morning to All,” Sam H. Harris, producer of As Thousands Cheer,
last week found himself the defendant in a Federal plagiarism suit asking
payment of $250 for each and every performance of the song. . . .  Lyricist
Patty Hill, who will share in the damages, if any, had no complaint to make
on the use of the words because she long ago resigned herself to the fact that
her ditty had become common property of the nation.12  
12 Defendants’ hearsay objection is OVERRULED.  The first level of
hearsay, the newspaper article, is subject to the ancient records exception.  Fed. R.
Evid. 803(16).  The second level of hearsay, the statement, is one against pecuniary
interest.  Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A).  We reject Defendants’ speculation that Patty
did not understand the consequences of making the statement.  The statement
appears in an article about a lawsuit over the public performance of Happy
Birthday.  We conclude that this evidence is admissible because it is reasonable to
infer that Patty was aware of the potential consequences of disclaiming her rights
to the Happy Birthday lyrics while talking to a reporter about her sister’s lawsuit
over the rights to another element of the same song.  See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).  
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(J.A. 90 at 1047 (emphasis added).)  The clear implication from the article is that Patty
told the TIME journalist that she had surrendered any claim she may have had to the
Happy Birthday lyrics.  A public statement like this, if believed, is an overt act on which a
reasonable fact finder could base a finding that Patty abandoned her copyright interest in
the lyrics.  See Melchizedek v. Holt, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048, 1061 (D. Ariz. 2011)
(finding triable issue of fact where author made public statements indicating that he was
not interested in protecting his work).  However, we cannot say that this evidence is
sufficient to entitle Plaintiffs to a directed verdict at trial inasmuch as it is not a direct
quote from Patty.  The journalist could have been paraphrasing something she said or
relying on a secondary source to characterize her intentions.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
Motion on their affirmative defense of abandonment is DENIED.13  To the extent
Defendants cross-move for summary judgment on abandonment, we conclude that this
article is at least sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to whether Patty abandoned her
rights.   
2. Joint Authorship
In the alternative, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on
abandonment because Mildred and Patty were joint authors of the Happy Birthday lyrics
so that Plaintiffs must at least raise triable issues of fact as to both Mildred’s (or Jessica’s
as heir to Mildred’s rights) and Patty’s abandonment to survive summary judgment
against them.  They argue that even if there are triable issues as to Patty’s abandonment,
Plaintiffs have no evidence of any overt acts of abandonment by either Mildred or Jessica. 
13 Plaintiffs also argue that two other articles published about the filing of the
As Thousands Cheer lawsuit constitute overt acts of abandonment.  (J.A. 34, 37.) 
Because neither contained any statement from either Patty or Jessica purporting to
express their intent to abandon the lyrics, these articles also do not entitle Plaintiffs
to summary judgment. 
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A joint work is defined as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 Act); Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures,
Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the 1976 Act’s definition of joint
work “incorporated the well-established case law interpreting the definition of ‘joint
work’ under the 1909 Act”).  The Ninth Circuit has articulated three factors to consider in
determining joint authorship: (1) whether the “putative coauthors ma[de] objective
manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors”; (2) whether the alleged authors
superintended the work by exercising control; and (3) whether “the audience appeal of the
work” can be attributed to both authors, and whether “the share of each in its success
cannot be appraised.”  Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
Defendants point to Patty’s deposition testimony in the As Thousands Cheer
litigation in which she described working with Mildred in a collaborative, iterative process
to create Good Morning and the other songs in Song Stories.  (See J.A. 87 at 1007 (“It
would be written and I would take it into the school the next morning and test it with the
little children.  If the register was beyond the children we went back home at night and
altered it and I would go back the next morning and try it again and again until we secured
a song that even the youngest children could learn with perfect ease . . . .”); see also id. at
1004 (“We were writing songs from 1889 to 1893.”); id. at 1006 (“When my sister
Mildred and I began the writing of these songs . . . .”).)  If Mildred and Patty created the
Happy Birthday lyrics as a part of this process, that would be evidence that Mildred and
Patty intended to be co-authors and that both exercised control over the work. 
It is not clear from Patty’s deposition that the Happy Birthday lyrics were created as
a part of the described collaborative process.  The deposition took place in the context of a
lawsuit in which Jessica was asserting infringement of the copyright to Good Morning,
26
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not Happy Birthday.  Accordingly, virtually the entire deposition centered on how Song
Stories and Good Morning were created.  There are very few points in the transcript where
one can discern any clear reference to Happy Birthday.  A reasonable fact finder could
find that Patty’s discussions of her collaboration with Mildred are not relevant because she
was not talking about how the Happy Birthday lyrics were created.  If Mildred had
developed the Happy Birthday/Good Morning melody specifically for use with the Good
Morning lyrics but Patty decided, on her own initiative, to use other lyrics in combination
with the melody, then a fact finder could find that the Happy Birthday lyrics belonged to
Patty alone as a derivative work.  In that event, Mildred would not have had the requisite
intent to combine her work (the Happy Birthday/Song Stories melody) with the Happy
Birthday lyrics in order to make Happy Birthday a “work prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 Act); see also 1-6 Nimmer § 6.05 (“The
requisite distinction must lie instead in the intent of each contributing author at the time
her contribution is composed.  If his work is written with the intention that [his]
contribution . . . be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,
then the merger of his contribution with that of others creates a joint work.  If that
intention occurs only after the work has been written, then the merger results in a
derivative or collective work.”) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
Both Parties also try to use the pleadings to the Hill-Summy lawsuit from 1942 to
reinforce their arguments about joint or sole authorship.  Defendants emphasize the fact
that the Hill Foundation described Happy Birthday as “written and composed” by Patty
and Mildred.  (J.A. 50 at ¶ 11.)  Plaintiffs emphasize the fact that Good Morning was
described as being “later” entitled Happy Birthday by both the Hill Foundation and
Summy Co.  (Id. at ¶ 10; J.A. 51 at ¶ 6.)   Both of these arguments are inadequate to
resolve, as a matter of law, the factual questions surrounding the creation of the Happy
Birthday lyrics. 
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Because neither Party is entitled to summary judgment, we need not also consider
whether there are triable issues as to Mildred’s or Jessica’s abandonment inasmuch as that
issue is dependent on the joint authorship inquiry which cannot be resolved due to triable
issues of fact.  
The Parties’ Cross-Motions for summary judgment on the issue of abandonment are
DENIED.
E.  Transfer of the Happy Birthday Lyrics
Plaintiffs argue that, even if the Hill sisters never lost or abandoned their common
law rights to the Happy Birthday lyrics before the publication in E51990, Defendants have
no evidence that Summy Co. ever obtained those rights.  They contend that the evidence
shows that E51990 was merely for one of several piano arrangements that Jessica
authorized Summy Co. to publish and register.  This showing is sufficient to discharge
Plaintiffs’ initial burden under Rule 56 as the party without the burden of proof at trial. 
Defendants argue that one or more of the agreements between the Hill sisters/the Hill
Foundation and Summy Co. raise at least a triable issue that the former had transferred
rights to the Happy Birthday lyrics to the latter.
 
1. The Hill-Summy Agreements
On the record before us, there is evidence of three agreements between the Hill
sisters/the Hill Foundation and Summy Co.—the First, Second, and Third Agreements. 
28
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Defendants’ primary argument is that Jessica transferred rights in the Happy Birthday
lyrics to Summy Co. under the Second Agreement in 1934 and 1935.  (See, e.g., Jt. Br. at
35, 37; Jt. Supp. Br. at 16.)  What little we know of the Second Agreement is entirely
based on the pleadings filed in the Hill-Summy lawsuit in 1942.  The actual agreement is
not in the record; nor is there any other description of the agreement.  To determine the
content of Second Agreement, then, we must examine the Hill-Summy pleadings closely,
and in context.
The Amended Complaint contained two relevant causes of action.14  In the first
cause of action, the Hill Foundation alleged that Mildred and Patty entered into the First
Agreement in the 1890s, granting Mr. Summy and Summy Co. the rights to publish and
register various versions of Song Stories in return for royalties on every copy sold.  (J.A.
50 at ¶¶ 4-10.)  The Amended Complaint noted that “one of the songs contained in the
works mentioned and described in paragraphs ‘FOURTH’ to ‘EIGHTH’ [the paragraphs
describing the various published versions of Song Stories] is one entitled ‘GOOD
MORNING TO ALL’ which, with words written by the said PATTY S. HILL, was later
entitled ‘HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU’ and was included among the songs copyrighted
as aforesaid[15] by the said SUMMY.”  (Id. at ¶ 10.)  The Hill Foundation alleged that
“said song, ‘HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU’,” later acquired a “nation-wide popularity”
and was widely performed both musically and dramatically.  (Id. at ¶ 11.) 
The Amended Complaint then alleged that, at the time of the First Agreement,
“sound motion pictures were unknown commercially.”  (Id. at ¶ 15.)  Therefore, the First
14 The third cause of action—alleging that Summy Co. unlawfully tried to
acquire an interest in the Song Stories copyright from the estate of the Hill sisters’
brother, William Hill—is not relevant.
15 The “aforesaid” paragraphs referred to the copyrights in Good Morning
and Song Stories.  (See J.A. 50 at ¶ 12.)  The Happy Birthday lyrics were never
made part of any of these copyrights.
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Agreement did not “contemplate the use of the aforementioned songs in sound motion
pictures or dramatic performances or in any other wise or manner except in sheet music
form.”  (Id.)  Accordingly, the First Agreement did not give Summy Co. “the right to grant
licenses or sub-licenses to the producers of sound motion pictures or dramatic
performances in respect to the use of any of said songs therein and in particular the
aforesaid song ‘HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU.’”  (Id.)  And yet, according to the
Amended Complaint, that was precisely what Summy Co. had been doing: “secretly
enter[ing] into various agreements with the producers of sound motion pictures and of
stage or dramatic performances . . . for the sound and dialogue rights for the use of the
song ‘HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU’ and purport[ing] to hold itself out as having the
right to grant licenses or sub-licenses in respect to the use of the aforesaid song.”  (Id. at ¶
18.)  This conduct, the Hill Foundation alleged, was “in violation of the rights conferred
upon” the Hill sisters and the Hill Foundation “by the copyright laws of the United States
of America.”  (Id. at ¶ 20.)  
In the second cause of action, the Hill Foundation alleged that Jessica had entered
into another agreement in 1934 and 1935—the Second Agreement—granting Summy Co.
“a number of licenses for the publication, sale and performance of various piano
arrangements of the song variously entitled ‘GOOD MORNING TO ALL’ or ‘HAPPY
BIRTHDAY TO YOU’” in return for further royalties.  (Id. at ¶ 24.)  In contrast to the
First Agreement, the Second Agreement apparently contemplated the use of these piano
arrangements in motion pictures and plays, because Jessica was entitled to 50% of any
payment Summy Co. received for the “performance [of the works] in any country.”  (Id. at
¶ 26 (emphasis added); see also id. at ¶ 24 (licenses granted “for the publication, sale and
performance of various piano arrangements”) (emphasis added).)  The Hill Foundation
then went on to say that “by reason of [Summy Co.’s] breach of duty and wrongful
conduct as alleged in the paragraphs . . . ‘EIGHTEENTH’ to ‘TWENTIETH’ [the
paragraphs in the first cause of action describing the secret licensing agreements granted
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by Summy Co. to movie and play producers],” it was electing to terminate the Second
Agreement.  (Id. at ¶ 29.) 
In its Answer, Summy Co. took issue with some of the Hill Foundation’s
allegations, but it agreed with most of the important points.  As to the First Agreement,
Summy Co. denied that the Hill sisters had granted it only limited rights in the sheet music
of Song Stories, but admitted that it had granted licenses to movie and play producers for
Happy Birthday.  (J.A. 51 at ¶¶ 9, 12.)  As to the Second Agreement, Summy Co.
described it as “several so-called royalty contracts wherein and whereby it was provided
that the said Jessica M. Hill sold, assigned, and transferred to [Summy Co.] various piano
arrangements of the said musical composition ‘Good Morning To All’ and all world rights
(including publishing, public performance and mechanical reproduction rights) . . . of said
work” in return for royalties.  (Id. at ¶ 18.)  Summy Co. confirmed that Jessica was to
receive 50% of any payment made to Summy Co. for the “performance of said work.” 
(Id.)
Defendants argue that a fact finder could reasonably infer from these pleadings that
Jessica transferred rights to the Happy Birthday lyrics to Summy Co. under the Second
Agreement, thus raising an issue of fact for trial.  We disagree.  Such an inference is so
implausible that no reasonable fact finder could so find.  See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586
(“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”).
First, and most importantly, an inference that the Second Agreement had something
to do with the Happy Birthday lyrics is not supported by any explicit description of the
agreement in either the Amended Complaint or the Answer.  Both the Hill Foundation and
Summy Co. described the agreement as transferring rights in “piano arrangements.”  (J.A.
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50 at ¶ 24; J.A. 51 at ¶ 18.)  Obviously, pianos do not sing.  Thus, it is not logical to infer
that rights to “piano arrangements” would include rights to any lyrics or words as well. 
Defendants argue that the lyrics must have been part of the Second Agreement
because the Amended Complaint described the arrangements as based on the “song
variously entitled ‘GOOD MORNING TO ALL’ or ‘HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU.’” 
(J.A. 50 at ¶ 24 (emphasis added).)  But this quoted statement says nothing about the
transfer of any lyrics.  The Happy Birthday lyrics could not have been “variously entitled”
“Good Morning To All.”  If anything, it is a reference to the fact that Good Morning and
Happy Birthday have the same melody and therefore are, in that sense, the same song that
formed the basis of the piano arrangements.  Notably, only a few sentences later, the Hill
Foundation described the content of works involved in the Second Agreement again, but
this time it called them “various piano arrangements of said song ‘GOOD MORNING TO
ALL’” with no reference to Happy Birthday at all.  (Id. at ¶ 29.)  In its Answer, Summy
Co. similarly described the works as “various piano arrangements of the said musical
composition ‘Good Morning To All’” without mentioning Happy Birthday.16  (J.A. 51 at ¶
18.)
  
Second, an inference that the Second Agreement covered the lyrics is unreasonable
because it would be inconsistent with the underlying legal theory behind the lawsuit.  If
16 It is true, as Defendants point out, that neither the Hill Foundation nor
Summy Co. ever explicitly said that the Second Agreement did not include the
Happy Birthday lyrics.   (Hr’g Tr. of March 23, 2015 at 37:10-13 (“COURT: . . .
Doesn’t that seem to say that all that was licensed was piano arrangements, not the
lyrics?  It doesn’t say anything about lyrics as far as I can see.  MR. KLAUS: It
doesn’t say lyrics were not included.”).)  But that is hardly surprising inasmuch as
the agreements were about piano arrangements.  Moreover, it is Defendants’
burden to prove there was a transfer.  The absence of evidence, without more, does
not help Defendants carry their burden at trial or raise a triable factual issue here
on summary judgment. 
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the Second Agreement had covered the Happy Birthday lyrics, that would have meant that
in 1934 and 1935 Jessica explicitly granted Summy Co. the right to license the lyrics to
others for public performance.  (J.A. 50 at ¶ 24 (Second Agreement granted Summy Co.
rights to “the publication, sale and performance”) (emphasis added); id. at ¶ 26 (Second
Agreement gave Jessica right to 50% of any payment Summy Co. received for the
“performance [of the works] in any country.”); J.A. 51 at ¶ 18. (Second Agreement gave
Summy Co. “all world rights (including publishing, public performance and mechanical
reproduction rights) . . . of said work”) (emphasis added); id. (Second Agreement gave
Jessica rights to 50% of any payment Summy Co. received “for the mechanical
reproduction or performance” of the work “in any country”) (emphasis added).)  If that
were the case, there would have been no reason for the Hill Foundation to accuse Summy
Co. of “secretly” entering into deals behind the Hill sisters’ backs with movie and play
producers, granting them permission to publically perform Happy Birthday.  Moreover,
there would have been no reason for Summy Co. not to point out in its Answer that it had
acquired the public performance rights to the lyrics from Jessica under the Second
Agreement, since that fact would have given the company a strong defense to the
accusation that what they were doing was somehow a “secret” or was otherwise unlawful.
Third, Defendants posit that the allegations in the Amended Complaint can be read
to indirectly imply that the Second Agreement covered the Happy Birthday lyrics.  But
this theory is based on a misunderstanding of what the Amended Complaint actually said.
Defendants’ theory appears to be that the Hill Foundation sued Summy Co. because
Jessica had granted Summy Co. permission to publish and distribute copies of the Happy
Birthday lyrics in sheet music form under the Second Agreement, but Summy Co. had
exceeded the scope of that agreement by granting movie and play producers the rights to
publically perform the lyrics.  (See Jt. Supp. Br. at 16 (“In 1934 and 1935, Jessica granted
Summy the rights to publish, copyright, and sell Happy Birthday to You [including the
lyrics] as sheet music, in exchange for a percentage of the list price for sales. . . .  Patty
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and Jessica’s foundation, the Hill Foundation, sued Summy in 1942.  The Foundation
asserted that Summy had exceeded the scope of its license to publish Happy Birthday to
You sheet music by sublicensing the ‘sound and dialogue rights for the use of the
song’—i.e., the melody and lyrics—in movies and plays.”) (emphasis in original); see also
Hr’g Tr. of July 29, 2015 at 52:6-62:6 (colloquy with Defendants’ counsel discussing
transfer theory based on the Amended Complaint); Hr’g Tr. of March 23, 2015 at 37:8-
40:11 (same).)
Defendants’ theory is not consistent with the allegations in the Amended
Complaint.  As discussed, the Second Agreement was not limited to sheet music.  That
was the First Agreement.  Moreover, the Hill Foundation did not accuse Summy Co. of
exceeding the scope of the Second Agreement.  That was, again, the First Agreement.  In
fact, the Hill Foundation did not accuse Summy Co. of doing anything unlawful with
respect to the Second Agreement.  Rather, it sought termination of the Second Agreement
in light of Summy Co.’s alleged unlawful conduct with respect to the First Agreement. 
Finally, the Hill Foundation’s accusation that Summy Co. exceeded the scope of the rights
it possessed had nothing to do with the Happy Birthday lyrics.  The Hill Foundation
leveled that accusation in the first cause of action in the context of discussing the First
Agreement, which covered only the Happy Birthday/Good Morning melody, not the
Happy Birthday lyrics.17   
17 Defendants suggest in their briefing that because the Hill Foundation
described the licenses that Summy Co. granted as concerning “dialogue rights,”
this somehow meant that Summy Co. was accused of granting licenses for the
public performance of the lyrics specifically, not just the melody.  (See Jt. Supp.
Br. at 16 (“The Foundation asserted that Summy had exceeded the scope of its
license to publish Happy Birthday to You sheet music by sublicensing the ‘sound
and dialogue rights for the use of the song’—i.e., the melody and lyrics—in movies
and plays.”) (emphasis in original).)  There is no logical reason to make such an
assumption—an actor singing in a movie can reproduce the melody of a song just
as easily as the lyrics—and Defendants cite nothing in support of their
34
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Finally, Defendants argue that Summy Co. must have been given the rights to the
Happy Birthday lyrics because, otherwise, the Hill Foundation would have sued Summy
Co. for publishing the lyrics in sheet music form without permission in 1935, in addition
to accusing the company of granting unauthorized licenses to movie producers and others
for public performance of those lyrics.  (See Hr’g Tr. of July 29, 2015 at 59:11-21 (“MR.
KLAUS: Your Honor, the question I would have, Your Honor, is then why seven years
after Summy had published Happy Birthday to You with lyrics [as E51990] and if
Jessica—if Jessica Hill is complaining about the fact that you are using this in motion
pictures and I don’t—I don’t like you using it in motion pictures and I only granted you a
license with respect to a particular musical arrangement that some other people have
called Good Morning to All and some other people call Happy Birthday to You, why is
there no complaint by Jessica Hill or the Hill Foundation about Summy’s publishing the
sheet music, including the lyrics?”).)  This argument fails as well.  The record contains no
evidence that the Hill Foundation chose not to sue Summy Co. for publishing the lyrics
because Jessica had authorized the company to publish them.  Defendants’ argument is
based on unsupported speculation, which cannot create a triable issue of fact in and of
itself, especially where that speculation is premised in part on a theory that, for the reasons
discussed above, would be inconsistent with, and is a misreading of, the allegations in the
Amended Complaint.  See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir.
2009) (“While we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,
we need not draw inferences that are based solely on speculation.”).
Defendants’ fall-back argument is that, even if the Hill sisters/the Hill Foundation
had not granted Summy Co. any rights in the Second Agreement, the Hill Foundation did
interpretation of “dialogue rights.”  In any event, even if dialogue rights meant
lyrics, which we doubt, Defendants’ argument fails because that theory would run
contrary to their argument that the rights to the lyrics were granted to Summy Co.
in the Second Agreement which, according to the Amended Complaint, included
performance rights.  
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so in the Third Agreement.  This argument fails as well.  Unlike the First and Second
Agreement, we have a copy of the Third Agreement in the record.   The Third Agreement
was entered into in 1944 to resolve the Hill-Summy lawsuit.  (See J.A. 126 at ¶ g.)  Under
the agreement, the Hill Foundation and the Hill sisters transferred all their “right, title and
interest . . . in” eleven different registered copyrighted works, including all the copyrights
to the various published versions of Song Stories and the copyrights to E51990 and four
other piano-based versions of Happy Birthday (presumably, the “various piano
arrangements” of the Second Agreement).  (Id. at ¶¶ a, 2.)  Nowhere in the agreement is
there any discussion of the Happy Birthday lyrics; nor is there any suggestion that the Hill
sisters transferred their common law rights in the Happy Birthday lyrics to Summy Co.
The argument that the Third Agreement transferred the Happy Birthday lyrics to
Summy Co. is circular.  The agreement could have transferred such rights only if the lyrics
were within the scope of one of the eleven copyrighted works that were the subject of the
agreement.  But the lyrics could have been within the scope of those registered copyrights
only if, at some point in the past, the Hill sisters had given Summy Co. authorization to
publish and register the lyrics.  As already discussed, there is no evidence showing that the
Hill sisters ever did that.  Other than this circular argument, the Third Agreement itself
contains no reference to the transfer of the Happy Birthday lyrics.18 
18 Defendants cite two cases, Bridgeport Music, 2014 WL 7877773, and
Sylvestre v. Oswald, No. 91 Civ. 5060 (JSM), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7002,
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1993), that they claim stand for the proposition that any
material appearing in a deposit copy is considered within the scope of the
registration.  These cases are distinguishable in that they address the “scope” of a
registration to determine what copyright material is considered registered for
purposes of satisfying the Copyright Act’s requirement that “[r]egistration is a
necessary precursor to a suit for infringement.”  Sylvestre, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7002, at *3; see also Bridgeport Music, 2014 WL 7877773, at *8 (noting that the
question of what material was present in the deposit copy could “bear on the
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One last point is that we are mindful of the fact that the Second and Third
Agreements, whatever their contents, cannot be considered in a vacuum.  Defendants urge
us to look to the intent of the contracting parties.  (Hr’g Tr. of March 23, 2015 at 41:15-22
(“COURT: I’ll take another look at the 1944 assignment, but it seems to me the 1944
assignment just assigned whatever rights they may have had in those specific copyright
certificates as identified.  So if that’s it, then your argument becomes a little bit circular.
MR. KLAUS: Well, I think it was all—it’s a matter of intent as to what was covered by
the assignment, Your Honor.”).)  But Defendants cannot point to any particular evidence
that would show us the intent of contracting parties, aside from the evidence that we have
already discussed.  There is no evidence that Patty or any of the Hill sisters ever fought to
protect the Happy Birthday lyrics on their own such that we might infer that they would
have wanted to give their rights to Summy Co. to continue to protect them.  The Hill
sisters never tried to obtain a copyright for Happy Birthday on their own, even though
Patty claimed to have written the lyrics decades earlier.  None of the Hill sisters ever sued
anyone for infringing the lyrics.  Even Summy Co.’s behavior after the Third Agreement
was executed does not show that any transfer occurred.  Immediately after the Third
Agreement was executed, Summy Co. filed several lawsuits alleging that Happy Birthday
had been infringed.  Yet, it never asserted that E51990 or any copyright interest it
purportedly held in the lyrics had been infringed in those lawsuits.  Looking to the intent
of the parties does nothing to help Defendants’ case because there is no evidence that the
intent of the parties was to transfer the rights to the lyrics.   
copyright owner’s ability to bring a civil action” based on that material).  Neither
case involves a situation in which a party attempted to register material to which it
had no cognizable claim at the time of registration.  To the extent that these cases
suggest that E51990 could be considered a valid registration of the lyrics even if
Summy Co. did not have permission to publish or register them, they are not
binding on us and we decline to follow them. 
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2. Standing
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are completely barred from challenging the
transfer of the Happy Birthday lyrics because a third-party has no standing to challenge
existence of a transfer so long as the transferee and transferor do not dispute that the
transfer occurred.  Defendants rely chiefly on Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d
1424 (9th Cir. 1996) and Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1982) for this proposition.  (Hr’g Tr. at March 23, 2015 at 81:17-24 (“MR. KLAUS:
. . . There is no dispute in this case between my client, any of my client’s predecessors,
and anyone representing the Hill sisters as to whether or not Summy had—Summy was
entitled to make the registration in 1935 or not.  And I think under the logic of Eden Toys
and the Magnuson case, that would plainly—that would plainly say that they have no
standing to—to object on that ground.”).)  These cases do not support Defendants’
sweeping proposition.  
 In Eden Toys, the plaintiff had secured an exclusive license in 1975 from a
copyright owner to sell various forms of merchandise based on the owner’s work.  697
F.2d at 36.  In 1979, the defendant began selling reproductions of the work in the form of
“adult clothing,” which was not one of the types of merchandise covered by the license. 
Id.  When plaintiff sued defendant for infringing its rights as an exclusive licensee,
defendant protested that plaintiff did not have a license over “adult clothing” and therefore
had no standing to sue.  Id.  In response, plaintiff claimed that the copyright owner had
informally granted it a broader license before 1979 and produced an agreement from 1980
between the copyright holder and plaintiff that expanded the scope of the 1975 license to
cover merchandise like defendant’s.  Id.  The district court concluded that this evidence
was insufficient to prove a transfer had occurred before 1979 because both the 1909 and
the 1976 Copyright Acts required that certain transfers of rights, including exclusive
licenses, be memorialized in writing.  See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1976 Act) (“A transfer
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of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument
of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the
owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”); 17 U.S.C. § 28
(1909 Act) (“Copyright secured under this title or previous copyright laws of the United
States may be assigned, granted, or mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the
proprietor of the copyright, or may be bequeathed by will.”).   
The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the “informal” pre-1979 transfer was
not necessarily invalid.  Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 36.  Specifically, the court stated that “the
note or memorandum of the transfer [required under the Copyright Act] need not be made
at the time when the license is initiated; the requirement is satisfied by the copyright
owner’s later execution of a writing which confirms the agreement.”  Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Notably, the Second Circuit did not say that plaintiff could
satisfy the Copyright Act’s writing requirement by simply asserting, without any
evidence, that a transfer of rights had occurred at some point.  Rather, the Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to determine if plaintiff had sufficient evidence to
prove that there was an informal agreement before 1979.  Id. 
In Magnuson, plaintiff John Magnuson copyrighted a work in the name of his
company, Columbus Productions, Inc. (“Columbus”)  in 1968.  85 F.3d at 1426. 
Throughout the 1970s, he operated Columbus informally as its CEO and sole regular
employee.  Id.  During this time, he stopped using the name Columbus and started
operating the business as “John Magnuson Associates,” even granting licenses to third-
parties to use the copyrighted work under that name.  Id.  In 1979, the state of California
suspended Columbus’s corporate status for failure to pay taxes.  Id. at 1427.  In 1993, after
the plaintiff discovered that another individual had been distributing copies of the
copyrighted work for nearly a decade without authorization, plaintiff executed a written
transfer of the work between Columbus and “John Magnuson d/b/a John Magnuson and
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Associates,” and then filed an infringement suit.  Id. at 1427-28.  The defendant
challenged plaintiff’s standing to bring his lawsuit because there was no valid transfer of
the copyright.  Id. at 1428.  After a bench trial, the district court made factual findings that
Columbus had informally transferred the rights to plaintiff in the seventies, though not in
writing.  Id. at 1429.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s factual
findings were not clearly erroneous and concluded that the written memorandum from
1993, though it was not executed at the time of the actual transfer, was sufficient to satisfy
the Copyright Act’s writing requirement.  Id. 
Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, Magnuson and Eden Toys do not stand for the
proposition that so long as an alleged transferor and transferee say that a transfer occurred,
a third-party has no choice but to take them at their word.  Rather, these cases stand for the
proposition that, if there is evidence of a transfer, the informality with which the transfer
was conducted does not prevent the transferee from asserting an interest in the copyright. 
In particular, the narrow holding of both cases is that “under some circumstances a prior
oral grant that is confirmed by a later writing becomes valid as of the time of the oral grant
. . . .”  Id. at 1428; see also Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 36 (“[S]ince the purpose of the
[Copyright Act’s writing requirement] is to protect copyright holders from persons
mistakenly or fraudulently claiming oral licenses, the ‘note or memorandum of the
transfer’ need not be made at the time when the license is initiated; the requirement is
satisfied by the copyright owner’s later execution of a writing which confirms the
agreement.”).
Here, unlike in both Magnuson and Eden Toys, Defendants have no evidence a
transfer occurred, whether by oral statement, by writing, or by conduct.  The Second
Agreement was for piano arrangements.  The Third Agreement was for copyrighted
works, like Song Stories and the piano arrangements, that did not cover the lyrics.  See
supra Section V.E.1.  There is no other testimony or circumstantial evidence tending to
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show that a transfer of the lyrics occurred.19  In fact, Defendants cannot even point to
evidence showing that the Hill sisters transferred their rights in the lyrics to the Hill
Foundation, such that the Hill Foundation could, in turn, legitimately transfer them to
Summy Co.  The only agreements between the Hill sisters and the Hill Foundation in the
record concern the transfer of the same eleven copyrighted works that were the subject of
the Third Agreement.  (J.A. 42, 49, 113.)  The holdings of Eden Toys and Magnuson
cannot be stretched to suggest that under these circumstances, Plaintiffs are somehow
barred from challenging the existence of a transfer, especially where Defendants bear the
burden to prove they received rights from the author of the lyrics.  Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S.
at 361.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion is
GRANTED as to the issue of whether Summy Co. ever received the rights to the Happy
Birthday lyrics from the Hill sisters. 
19 Defendants have asserted at various times that there is evidence the Hill
sisters received royalties for licensing the Happy Birthday lyrics.  We disagree. 
There is evidence that the Hill sisters were entitled to royalties from Summy Co.
under the Third Agreement, but those were royalties for the reproduction and use
of the eleven copyright works already discussed.  (J.A. 126 at 1945-48.)  They also
may have been receiving royalties from the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) for performance of Happy Birthday, but there
is no evidence tending to show that ASCAP collected royalties for use of the lyrics
specifically, as opposed to the use of the melody.  Defendants contend that an
article from 1950 reported that they were receiving royalties from ASCAP for the
lyrics.  But the article merely reports that they were generally receiving royalties
for the song, not the lyrics specifically.  (J.A. 60 at 755 (reporting that Happy
Birthday was “very valuable” and that ASCAP was policing the “unlicensed
commercial use of the song”).)  Moreover, the same article, only a few paragraphs
later, reports that the lyrics were being freely used for public performance without
a license as late as 1947.  (See id. (“In the play ‘Happy Birthday’ which opened
early in 1947 . . . the words of ‘Happy Birthday to You’ were spoken, not sung,
when it was discovered that the well-known birthday song was not in the public
domain . . . .”).) 
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VI.  Conclusion
The summary judgment record shows that there are triable issues of fact as to
whether Patty wrote the Happy Birthday lyrics in the late Nineteenth Century and whether
Mildred may have shared an interest in them as a co-author.  Even assuming this is so,
neither Patty nor Mildred nor Jessica ever did anything with their common law rights in
the lyrics.  For decades, with the possible exception of the publication of The Everyday
Song Book in 1922, the Hill sisters did not authorize any publication of the lyrics.  They
did not try to obtain federal copyright protection.  They did not take legal action to prevent
the use of the lyrics by others, even as Happy Birthday became very popular and
commercially valuable.  In 1934, four decades after Patty supposedly wrote the song, they
finally asserted their rights to the Happy Birthday/Good Morning melody—but still made
no claim to the lyrics. 
Defendants ask us to find that the Hill sisters eventually gave Summy Co. the rights
in the lyrics to exploit and protect, but this assertion has no support in the record.  The Hill
sisters gave Summy Co. the rights to the melody, and the rights to piano arrangements
based on the melody, but never any rights to the lyrics.  Defendants’ speculation that the
pleadings in the Hill-Summy lawsuit somehow show that the Second Agreement involved
a transfer of rights in the lyrics is implausible and unreasonable.  Defendants’ suggestion
that the Third Agreement effected such a transfer is circular and fares no better.  As far as
the record is concerned, even if the Hill sisters still held common law rights by the time of
the Second or Third Agreement, they did not give those rights to Summy Co.  
42
Case 2:13-cv-04460-GHK-MRW   Document 244   Filed 09/22/15   Page 42 of 43   Page ID
 #:7423
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED and Plaintiffs’ Motion is
GRANTED as set forth above.20  Because Summy Co. never acquired the rights to the
Happy Birthday lyrics, Defendants, as Summy Co.’s purported successors-in-interest, do
not own a valid copyright in the Happy Birthday lyrics.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September ___, 2015
_______________________________
GEORGE H. KING
Chief United States District Judge
20 To the extent the Parties cross-move on the chain of title issue, their
Motions are denied as moot in light of our disposition of the transfer issue.  
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